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KRISTIAN v. COMCAST: ANOTHER DROP IN THE BUCKET, OR 
THE ACHILLES HEEL OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
BANNING CLASS MECHANISMS? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The average American routinely becomes a party to contracts.  Frequently, 
these are standard form contracts between an individual consumer and a 
corporation, which are drafted by the corporation.  More often than not 
consumers barely read, let alone comprehend, the implications and 
consequences of contracts they enter into.  Over the last few decades as the 
practicality of and deference to arbitration has risen and as corporations have 
faced an ever-growing need to avoid major litigation, arbitration clauses have 
been included in contracts between the ordinary consumer and the corporate 
seller.  Now, within the last decade, the trend has gone from the mere inclusion 
of an arbitration clause to also include a ban on class mechanisms in the 
arbitral forum.  The result for claimants is that they must arbitrate their claims, 
and must do so on an individual basis.  Far too often, consumers are unaware 
of such class action waivers or are unable to understand them until a dispute 
arises. 
As illustrated by a recent decision in the Fourth Circuit where parties 
signed a contract with a mandatory arbitration clause and a ban on class 
mechanisms, great injustice and difficulty can result for consumers subject to 
such provisions.1  In Davis v. ECPI College of Technology, forty-seven 
different individuals had claims against ECPI.  In order to arbitrate, and not 
consolidate the claims, there would have to be “47 different hearings with 47 
different arbitrators.”2  This would result in: 
An expert [on the case being required] to testify 47 [different] times.  Other 
witnesses, such as former teachers and staff at ECPI, would need to appear to 
testify 47 separate times (likely resulting in a loss of current employment).  
Due to the commonality of issues and evidence in all 47 cases, each of the 47 
 
 1. Davis v. ECPI Coll. of Tech., L.C., 227 F. App’x 250 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 2. Brief of Appellee at 6–8, Davis v. ECPI Coll. of Tech., L.C., No. 05-2122 (4th Cir. Jun. 
12, 2006).  The court noted that this is “precisely the reason why consolidation of cases should be 
and typically is ordered.”  Id.  The issue before the court was how claims should be arbitrated.  Id.  
The district court held that “absent consolidation, the ability of the Plaintiffs to obtain any relief 
by way of arbitration is severely compromised.”  Id.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) 
(allowing courts to consolidate actions where there is a “common question of law or fact”). 
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original Claimants is a witness in all 47 cases (resulting in 47 testimonies in 47 
hearings or, collectively, 2,209 testimonies).  [There are further multiplicities] 
with individual arbitrators conducting many hours of telephone conferences in 
each separate case, with multiple briefs requested, and multiple dates for 
submissions, all to be conducted and heard separately, 47 times.3 
Due to the conflict between the complications claimants face when forced 
to arbitrate small claims individually and corporate interests in dealing with 
disputes privately and in a cost and time-efficient manner, the inclusion of 
class action waivers has created confusion among and within the federal 
circuits, and among and within state courts.4  Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”), courts are supposed to enforce arbitration agreements as they are 
written.5  Where a contract is silent on whether or not arbitration can proceed 
as a class, all federal circuit courts have held there can be no class arbitration.6  
However, there are discrepancies among lower federal courts and among state 
courts.7  Moreover, when arbitration agreements explicitly prohibit class 
mechanisms, federal circuit courts, as well as state courts, are split on whether 
arbitration is then a valid form of dispute resolution at all.8 
On April 20, 2006, the First Circuit, in Kristian v. Comcast, held that a ban 
on class mechanisms in a mandatory arbitration clause was unenforceable and 
severable where plaintiffs’ claims were based on state and federal antitrust law 
because plaintiffs would be unable to vindicate their statutory rights under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.9  The Court’s decision is novel in that it is 
 
 3. Brief of Appellee, supra note 2, at 8–9.  The district court, in support of its finding that 
consolidating arbitration in this case was the only way to allow Plaintiffs to vindicate their rights, 
recognized that “[i]t can be predicted without fear of contradiction that ECPI’s lawyers intend to 
make these 47 separate proceedings as costly and as difficult as possible for the Plaintiffs.”  
Therefore, it seems this also played a role in the court’s decision.  Id. at 9. 
 4. See Cari K. Dawson, Arbitration Agreements: No Longer Defendants’ Silver Bullet to 
Defeat Class Actions, 22 ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS AND DIR. LIAB. LITIG. REP. 13 (2007). 
 5. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions: A Contradiction in Terms, in 
PRACTISING LAW INST., 11TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE 
117 (2006).  At the time Kaplinsky wrote his article “[t]hree federal courts of appeals and several 
federal district courts [had] considered whether an arbitration may proceed on a class-wide basis, 
and they [all] unanimously concluded that it may not absent a provision in the arbitration 
agreement or the applicable arbitration rules specifically authorizing class arbitration.”  Id. at 101.  
See also Joshua S. Lipshutz, The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent Course at the 
Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1677, 1679 (2005) (noting that since the 1980s “[p]redispute arbitration agreements are 
enforceable bilateral contracts binding the parties as any other contract would, and the Federal 
Arbitration Act [FAA] ensures that courts will treat such contracts on equal footing with all other 
contracts”). 
 6. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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only the second federal circuit court, out of the six to consider the issue, to find 
such an agreement unenforceable.10  More importantly, it is the first circuit 
court to base its decision on a vindication of statutory rights theory.  The 
purpose of this Note is to explore this decision and to determine its role in 
resolving confusion among the courts. 
This Note first reviews the history and policy behind arbitration in the 
United States.  Second, it reviews the policy and history behind class actions.  
Third, it provides a summary of cases upholding arbitration agreements.  
Fourth, it addresses the conflict created among courts due to the growing trend 
of banning class mechanisms in mandatory arbitration agreements.  Fifth, it 
analyzes the decision in Kristian v. Comcast and the unenforceability of class 
action waivers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  Finally, this Note 
examines the affects of Kristian v. Comcast on this unclear area of law and 
predicts how future courts will utilize the decision. 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The use of arbitration, the process by which the parties to a dispute submit 
their differences to the judgment of an impartial person or group of persons 
appointed by the mutual consent of the parties, only arose as a common and 
accepted method of dispute resolution in the United States in the last fifty 
years.11  Even though its widespread usage in the United States is recent, 
arbitration dates back to Greek mythology12 and “was an established method of 
dispute resolution among merchants and in the maritime industry in pre-
colonial England.”13  While there are traces of arbitration in America’s early 
history, its wide-spread appeal, popularity, and application are recent.14 
A. Arbitration Policy and the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 
When America was first settled, arbitration concepts borrowed from 
English common law were used to resolve disputes quickly, efficiently, and 
with little cost to the parties.15  While arbitration was used with some level of 
frequency, its enforcement was entirely voluntary.16  Moreover, it was initially 
 
 10. See infra Part V.B.   
 11. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND 
TORT CLAIMS 3 (Alan I. Widiss ed., Practicing Law Institute 1979). 
 12. STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 9 (2002). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678 (“In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court changed its 
outlook on arbitration agreements, ushering a new era in which arbitration agreements between 
companies and consumers would be not only allowed but ‘favored.’”).  See generally id.; 
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 3. 
 15. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9. 
 16. Id. 
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used only by commercial or trade groups.17  The very essence of arbitration 
was that it was voluntarily agreed to by both parties as a means of resolving 
disputes quickly and cost efficiently.18  During America’s formative years, the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitration itself “depended on 
community ties and pressures for its effectiveness.”19  Trade groups created 
their own rules of dispute resolution which were enforced by elders and the 
community as a whole.20 
As America grew and emerged as an industrial nation, these community 
ties weakened, and the trust inherent in arbitration lessened.21  As a result, 
arbitration became even less appealing to parties.22  Where parties did arbitrate, 
which was normally between businesses or sophisticated, business-minded 
people contracting, agreements to arbitrate went from informal oral agreements 
to written agreements or contracts to arbitrate.23  Still, inherent in these formal 
written documents was the equal standing of the parties and their voluntary 
choice to submit their disputes to arbitration.24  Throughout this period, 
arbitration was not a favored method of dispute resolution and was largely 
frowned upon by the courts.25  In fact, “under the common law rule, a party to 
an arbitration agreement could revoke the agreement at any time, up to the 
point that the arbitrator rendered a decision.”26 
However, into the twentieth century, and with the rise of labor unions, 
“both unions and management increasingly recognized that all parties needed a 
speedy, inexpensive and fair method to resolve the numerous disputes that 
arose in the context of modern industrial operations.”27  Also, with the growth 
of the country, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the justice system due 
to “excessive delay, expense, inflexibility, and judicial gridlock.”28  A need for 
 
 17. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 308 (2000). 
 18. See id. at 309–10; see also Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678.  Before 1980, arbitration 
normally occurred between two businesses, not individual people or an individual and a 
company.  Id.  Also, public policy tended to disfavor arbitration and it was not considered 
mandatory or binding unless the parties agreed to it.  See id. at 1678–79.  Public policy was 
strongly opposed to enforcing mandatory arbitration between a corporation and an individual 
consumer.  Id. at 1678. 
 19. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9. 
 20. STONE, supra note 17, at 10. 
 21. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9. 
 22. Id.; see also STONE, supra note 17, at 4. 
 23. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9. 
 24. See STONE, supra note 17, at 378. 
 25. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 10. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. STONE, supra note 17, at 2. 
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another body, other than the courts, to preside over cases and render decisions 
was growing.29 
Shortly thereafter, in 1925, the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§1–14, was enacted by the 
United States Congress.30  In spite of the FAA’s recognition of the validity and 
enforceability of arbitration agreements, courts and legislatures continued to be 
skeptical of arbitration.31  In fact, throughout the 1920’s, and even into later 
decades, several states restricted arbitration to present disputes.32  It was not 
until several decades after implementation of the FAA that state legislatures 
began allowing parties to contract to arbitrate their future disputes.33  The 
courts, as well as state legislatures, did not really begin accepting arbitration as 
a legitimate course of dispute resolution until arbitration agreements in the area 
of international law arose.34  Gradually, as the Supreme Court saw the 
usefulness of arbitration in international agreements, it grew more and more 
sympathetic toward arbitration in the domestic sphere as well.35 
B. Federal Arbitration Act and Its Expanding Scope 
When the FAA was adopted in 1925, “it provide[d] for arbitration 
agreements in contracts involving maritime transactions and contracts 
evidencing transactions involving interstate or foreign commerce.”36  The FAA 
essentially made agreements to arbitrate enforceable and gave them the same 
rights as any other contract.37  After several landmark decisions, the FAA 
became applicable to seemingly intra-state transactions as well.38  Under the 
FAA, “[a] written provision. . . in an agreement. . . shall be ‘valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.’”39  In essence, the implementation of the FAA and 
its current translation “wipe away decades of judicial hostility toward 
arbitration.”40 Now, agreements to arbitrate, even between major 
 
 29. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 10. 
 30. STONE, supra note 17, at 313. 
 31. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11. 
 32. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 3. 
 33. Id. 
 34. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11. 
 35. Id. 
 36. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 4–5; see also STONE, supra note 17, at 
313; William M. Howard, Annotation, Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class Actions, 
13 A.L.R. 6TH 145 (2006) (“The Federal Arbitration Act . . . provides for the enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate in contracts involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions, 
which it deems valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
 37. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 17. 
 38. See generally id. at 17–18. 
 39. Id. at 18–19; see also Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 40. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 19. 
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conglomerates and the common consumer, are “as enforceable as any other 
contract.”41  Consumers are constantly faced with mandatory arbitration 
clauses in connection with their landline and cellular telephones, credit cards, 
cable services, health care providers, and commercial and residential leases.42  
Also, under the FAA, courts have the power to stay litigation and require 
parties to arbitrate if they have so contracted.43 
C. Arbitration Policy Today 
Since the 1980s, federal policy has been very much in favor of 
arbitration.44  Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has held that 
arbitration agreements are enforceable in both federal and state courts.45  
Arbitration can now be used as a form of dispute resolution in nearly every 
case with a contractual element.46  Where consumers have attacked alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms contained in standard form contracts of 
adhesion, courts have regularly upheld the contracts on the ground the parties 
were able to choose their dispute settlement procedure.47  Under this theory, 
courts say the parties are not giving up any substantive rights, and for that 
reason, arbitration can be upheld.48 
Arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion between corporations and 
the average consumer are now commonplace and enforceable.49  However, as 
this Note will address, forcing consumers to arbitrate claims pursuant to an 
agreement in a standard form contract can sometimes cause injustice and 
preclude consumers from being able to vindicate their statutory rights.50  It is 
in such cases that the courts are in conflict.51 
 
 41. Id.; see also STONE, supra note 17, at 378; Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678.   
 42. STONE, supra note 17, at iii; Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678–79. 
 43. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 20; see also Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1679 (“[E]ven when 
such contracts are deemed ‘adhesive’ by courts, meaning that the consumer was essentially forced 
to either accept the contract along with the product or service he was purchasing or reject both 
together, mandatory arbitration agreements have been deemed to be enforceable.”). 
 44. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678. 
 45. BENNETT, supra note 12, at 11. 
 46. STONE, supra note 17, at 378. 
 47. See Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1678–79. 
 48. Id. at 1680. 
 49. Id. at 1678. 
 50. See generally Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 51. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5; Lipshutz, supra note 5.  See also infra Part IV. 
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III.  HISTORY AND POLICY OF CLASS ACTIONS 
Because class actions and arbitration seem to be “contradiction[s] in 
terms,” the history and policy behind class actions is of great relevance.52  
Class actions, unlike arbitration, have been incorporated into the American 
legal system with little controversy.53  Class action mechanisms were first 
adopted by American courts in the nineteenth century, and in 1983, Rule 23, 
the rule regulating class actions, was added to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.54  The original draft of the rule was uncontroversial but proved to 
be unworkable.55  Rule 23 was entirely rewritten by the Advisory Committee 
in 1966 and is followed by federal courts today.56 
There are three main purposes of Rule 23.57  First, it is intended to promote 
judicial economy by preventing multiple suits on the same subject matter, 
which would slow judicial processes.58  Under 23(b)(1) a class action may be 
maintained where requiring individuals to bring separate claims would create a 
risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications. . . which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”59  Second, 
Rule 23 is meant to provide relief to those who would not otherwise be able to 
bring a suit individually where common relief is sought.60  For example, an 
individual generally will not bring a suit, absent class mechanisms, where his 
claim is very small or where the costs of litigation would outweigh the possible 
recovery.61  Third, Rule 23 was amended so that where multiple suits would be 
brought on the same claim or issue, class actions can ensure uniformity of 
decisions.62  Under Rule 23(c), notice of a lawsuit is to be given to all potential 
 
 52. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 99. 
 53. Defense News: Class Action Reform Gets a Shot in the Arm, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 263, 264 
(2002) [hereinafter Defense News] (“In 1938, Rule 23 was included in the new Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  The rule was adopted with little fanfare or discussion.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  The original version of Rule 23, which was drafted in 1938 “divided class actions 
into three categories: the ‘true,’ the ‘hybrid’ and the ‘spurious.’  These categories, with their 
infelicitous names and formalistic attributes, proved difficult to apply.”  Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Buford v. H&R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 345 (S.D. Ga. 1996). 
 58. Id. (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) (“Class actions 
serve three essential purposes: (1) to facilitate judicial economy by the avoidance of multiple suits 
on the same subject matter.”). 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); see also Defense News, supra note 53, at 264. 
 60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see also Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 345–46 (citing Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutt, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting that a second essential purpose of class 
actions is “to provide a feasible means for asserting the rights of those who ‘would have no 
realistic day in court if a class action were not available’”). 
 61. Defense News, supra note 53, at 264. 
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Buford, 168 F.R.D. at 346 (citing First Fed. of Mich. v. 
Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
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class members as well as notice of possible settlement.63  The rule also 
provides that “class members could be bound if they [do] not affirmatively opt 
out of (b)(3) damage class actions.”64 
Rule 23 was initially envisioned as a way to facilitate civil rights class 
actions under subsection (b)(2).65  While this purpose was served, law makers 
were unable to foresee the massive expansion of class action litigation that 
followed due to the opt-out provision under subsection (b)(3).66  Initially, class 
actions were not perceived as encompassing, for example, mass tort litigation, 
as they regularly do today.67  The advisory committee even noted that “[a] 
‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not 
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant 
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would 
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”68  This committee note 
suggests that Rule 23, while intended to facilitate class actions, was never 
intended to have the scope, in terms of the number of class actions and 
members joining classes, that it has today. 
In fact, the advisory committee sought to limit the broad scope of Rule 23 
on several occasions.  Most notably, in 1992, the committee sought to change 
the “opt-out” provision of Rule 23(b)(3), which is the provision of the rule 
most often used by those seeking class status.69  The draft would give courts 
the ability to certify a class as “opt-in” or as “opt-out.”70  In this way, courts 
could limit the number of class members to a suit who may not have ordinarily 
filed suit on their own or were too indifferent to opt out. 
One negative aspect of the “opt out” provisions is that even those who 
have no interest in the litigation can be joined to a lawsuit if they do not 
affirmatively “opt out.”  It does not follow, however, that those who are joined 
because they failed to take any action would have chosen to “opt in.”  First, 
class members who have genuine claims but wish to join as a class will see 
their rewards reduced if they have to be split amongst everyone in a class, even 
those who were not interested in bringing a claim.  Second, by not opting out 
 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c); see also Defense News, supra note 53, at 264. 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c); see also Defense News, supra note 53, at 264. 
 65. Defense News, supra note 53, at 264 (“It is probably fair to say that the 1966 committee 
was most interested in facilitating civil rights class actions for injunctive relief under b(2), and in 
this respect the committee's intentions were fully realized.”). 
 66. Id. at 264–65 ("[I]n adopting the 'opt-out' approach, the committee apparently had in 
mind small claim, consumer class actions in which no one class member would have a sufficient 
interest to litigate an individual claim and in which the forces of inertia might be greater than a 
potential class member's desire to participate, given the small stakes involved."). 
 67. Id. at 265. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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of a class action suit, an individual is then barred from bringing an independent 
action and is bound by the decision given in the class action case. 
In sum, while class actions have generally been approved by society and 
have not met with controversy as arbitration provisions have, their scope is 
greater than originally intended and has produced negative results for both 
those needing or wishing to join as a class and those who wish to bring claims 
individually.71  As this Note will address, questions over this broadened scope 
of class actions, coupled with expansion of mandatory arbitration provisions, 
has created a rift among and between state and federal courts. 
IV.  CLASS ACTIONS AND ARBITRATION: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS?72 
The debate over class arbitration has resulted in “a kaleidoscope of 
conflicting decisions [which continue] to emerge across state and federal 
courts nationwide, and [which produce] seemingly inconsistent rulings within 
a single jurisdiction.”73  While Kristian is novel in that a circuit court has never 
refused to enforce a mandatory arbitration provision banning class mechanisms 
on a theory of vindication of statutory rights, the split between the courts is 
not.  To shed more light on the context in which Kristian was decided, this 
Note will now discuss case law preceding the First Circuit’s decision. 
A. Arbitration v. Class Actions 
While the majority of courts uphold arbitration agreements explicitly as 
they are written, there is some confusion among state courts where the 
agreements are vague or silent on the issue of class arbitration.74  Moreover, 
both federal and state courts are in discord where arbitration agreements 
explicitly ban class mechanisms.  Most frequently, where arbitration has been 
held enforceable, courts have relied on state unconscionability statutes.75 
Until the First Circuit’s decision in Kristian, all other federal courts that 
considered whether arbitration may proceed on a class-wide basis, including 
three federal circuit courts and multiple federal district courts, held that it 
cannot where the arbitration agreement does not specifically authorize class 
arbitration.76  Therefore, if a contract was silent as to whether claims could be 
arbitrated as a class, the default rule was that they could not.  In reaching this 
 
 71. See Buford v. H&R Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 345 (S.D. Ga. 1996); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 65–68.  See generally Defense News, supra note 53. 
 72. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5. 
 73. Dawson, supra note 4, at 2. 
 74. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 117.  See also Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682. 
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holding, federal courts relied on Section 4 of the FAA.77  Rule 4 of the FAA 
states: 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition . . . for an order 
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such 
agreement. . . .  The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that 
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith 
is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.78 
Based on Rule 4 of the FAA, courts will generally look to the agreement 
between the parties to determine if they intended to arbitrate, and intended to 
do so on a class-wide basis.79  As held by the first federal courts to consider the 
issue, courts may only direct parties to arbitrate, and to do so on a class-wide 
basis, if the parties so agreed.80  Moreover, Supreme Court precedent dictates 
that the national policy in favor of arbitration is so strong that arbitration 
should be enforced even if multiple individual suits must be brought.81 
Even where a statute provides for class action litigation, such as the Truth 
in Lending Act (“TILA”), the Supreme Court has held there is no statutory 
right to join as a class.82  This is because there is “no congressional intent to 
preclude the enforcement of arbitration clauses in [the TILA’s] text, legislative 
history, or purpose,” and therefore arbitration clauses are still enforceable even 
if class action litigation is unavailable.83  While these decisions clearly conflict 
with the policy of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which allows class 
actions to be maintained for judicial economy, common injunctive relief and 
uniformity of decisions, there is ultimately not a right to class actions, and 
“[n]othing prevents [p]laintiffs from contracting away their right to a class 
action.”84 
 
 77. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 117. 
 78. Id. (emphasis added) (citing The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, § 4). 
 79. Id. (because parties did not agree to arbitrate on a class-wide basis, the court is powerless 
to require it). 
 80. Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F.Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding 
that the “[c]ourt must give effect to the agreement of the parities and this arbitration agreement 
makes no provision for class treatment or disputes”).  The court ultimately held it was without the 
power to order arbitration.  Id.  See also Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 118–21 (citing McCarthy v. 
Providential Corp., 1994 WL 387852 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994); Howard v. Klynveld Peat 
Marwick Goerderler, 977 F.Supp. 654, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 
55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995); Coleman v. Nat’l Movie-Dine, Inc. 449 F.Supp. 945, 947–48 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978)). 
 81. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F.Supp. 1410, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
 82. Id. at 1418 (‘“[TILA] does not create a ‘statutory right to pursue class actions.’”). 
 83. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 84. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 120 (citing Zawikowski v. Beneficial Nat. Bank, 1999 WL 
35304, *2 (N.D.Ill. 1999)); see also Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 
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Federal court decisions in favor of arbitration at all costs have even gone 
so far as to limit the seemingly all-encompassing legal power of arbitrators.  
Even though arbitrators are to “have all powers provided by law, including all 
legal and equitable remedies,” federal courts have held that they do not have 
the power to require or permit class action litigation unless the agreement 
specifically provides.85  Under the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate is supposed 
to be on equal footing with any other contract.86  For this reason, all federal 
courts and most state courts hold that arbitrators must view the language of 
arbitration agreements strictly and cannot imply class treatment was intended 
where the agreement was vague or silent on the issue of class mechanisms.87 
Even so, while federal courts have concluded that arbitration provisions, 
absent express language to the contrary, are to be performed on an individual 
basis, they have not been unanimous in reaching that result.88  For example, the 
Third Circuit required strict enforcement of arbitration agreements in 2000, but 
in 1999, that same court held that “the inability to obtain class-wide relief 
‘seems contrary to the underlying purpose of the TILA.’”89  In fact, most 
federal court decisions upholding arbitration were made by appellate courts 
overturning the decisions of federal district courts.  The conflict is not 
exclusive to the federal courts  as state courts are also at odds on issues 
involving arbitration and the common consumer.90  Because there is discord 
among courts as to class treatment when agreements to arbitrate are vague or 
silent, many corporations began including explicit bans on class mechanisms in 
their arbitration agreements.91  In this effort to end confusion, they “opened a 
new can of worms.”92 
 
1995).  In Champ, the plaintiff brought a class action complaint against the defendant under 
RICO and state laws.  Id.  The plaintiff claimed that she had a right to proceed as a class even if 
she had to arbitrate because the FAA is silent on the issue of class action litigation and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) “provides that in proceedings under the FAA, the federal rules 
apply to the extent not provided for in the FAA.”  Id.  The 7th Circuit rejected this argument, 
noting that the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their express 
terms, whereas Rule 81 applies only to judicial proceedings.  Id. at 276.  Basically, Rule 81 is 
only meant to be a gap filler and through its “express terms” the FAA has already covered class 
actions by saying arbitration agreements must be strictly enforced according to their terms. 
 85. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 120 (citing Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Corrin, Civil 
Action No. 97-74729 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 1998)). 
 86. See generally Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1679. 
 87. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 119. 
 88. See generally Lipshutz, supra note 5. 
 89. Kaplinsky, supra note 5, at 119 (citing Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F.Supp. 2d 264 
(D. Del. 1999)). 
 90. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1682. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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While most courts still enforce arbitration where there is an explicit ban on 
class mechanisms, several courts, most notably in California and the Ninth 
Circuit, have held that in these cases arbitration agreements are unenforceable.  
The California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit based their decisions on 
state unconscionability statutes.93  While the First Circuit’s holding in Kristian 
was not based on unconscionability, the court found it persuasive and 
somewhat analogous to a vindication of statutory rights theory.94 
Generally, there are two prongs to unconscionability, and both must be 
proved.95  First, a contract must be substantively unconscionable.96  This 
means the terms of the contract must unfairly burden one party and unfairly 
favor another such that no reasonable person would agree to the terms and no 
honest person would accept them.97  Second, a contract must be procedurally 
unconscionable.98  This determination “focuses on the bargaining conditions 
under which the parties agreed to the contract.”99  This is based in part on the 
sophistication and bargaining power of the parties.100  Unconscionability 
statutes are used in the context of arbitration “to achieve [a] state’s public 
policy goal of ensuring that plaintiffs will have an opportunity to bring class 
action suits against companies.”101 
V.  KRISTIAN V. COMCAST 
While bans on class arbitration have only been included in standard form 
contracts within the last ten to fifteen years and were consistently upheld in the 
majority of state and federal courts, there is still a great deal of confusion and 
inconsistency in rulings.102  Even the Supreme Court has found “artful ways to 
dodge these thorny [issues].”103  However, in an attempt to elucidate this 
unclear area of law, the First Circuit decided Kristian v. Comcast and provided 
a detailed analysis of its decision.  This Note will now provide the facts, 
holding and reasoning of that case. 
A. Procedural History 
Martha Kristian (“Kristian”) represented a class of plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) 
who received cable service from Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) in Boston, 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 60 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 95. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1694. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1695. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1696. 
 102. See generally Kaplinsky, supra note 5. 
 103. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1683. 
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Massachusetts.104  The Plaintiffs filed complaints in both state and federal 
court claiming that Comcast and its predecessor in interest inflated the costs of 
their cable services “as a result of anticompetitive practices.”105  Comcast, 
pursuant to a mandatory arbitration provision in its Policies & Practices, 
sought to force arbitration.106  Thereafter, Plaintiffs claimed that Comcast’s 
arbitration policies did not apply to them as they were added after the plaintiffs 
began receiving service from Comcast, and that even if the arbitration 
agreement could apply, it was unenforceable because it precluded all class 
actions.107  Ultimately, the First Circuit held that Comcast’s arbitration policies 
did apply retroactively.108  Even so, it held the policies were unenforceable 
because they precluded class actions and therefore precluded Plaintiffs from 
vindicating their statutory rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.109 
B. Facts 
The Plaintiffs began receiving cable service from Comcast between 1987 
and 1999.110  During that period, Comcast’s contracts did not contain 
arbitration agreements.111  However, “in 2001, Comcast began including an 
arbitration provision in the terms and conditions governing the relationship 
between Comcast and its subscribers.”112  In 2002, the arbitration provision 
was amended and differed substantially from the 2001 policies.113  Both the 
2002 and 2003 Comcast Policies & Procedures required mandatory arbitration 
and banned all forms of class representation.114  Comcast’s 2002/2003 Policies 
 
 104. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2006).  Plaintiffs-Appellees were 
James D. Masterman, Paul Pinella, Jack Rogers, and Martha Kristian.  Id.  All were Boston area 
subscribers for Comcast's services.  Id.  They began receiving service in 1987, 1991, 1994, and 
1999 respectively.  Id.  The mandatory arbitration provision was not added until 2001.  Id.  The 
ban on class action waivers was not added until 2002/2003.  Id.  All four Plaintiffs received 
notice of the change in terms along with their statements in November of each year.  Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 31. 
 108. Id. at 64. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.   
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 31–32.  The 2002/2003 Comcast Policies & Practices, in relevant part, provided in 
bold capital letters: 
If we are unable to resolve informally any claim or dispute, we have agreed to binding 
arbitration.  There shall be no right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class 
action or consolidated basis or on a bases involving claims brought in a purported 
representative capacity on behalf of the general public (such as a private attorney general), 
other subscribers, or other person similarly situated unless your state's laws provide 
otherwise. 
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and Practices were at the center of this dispute.115  Each cable subscriber 
received notice of the terms and conditions of subscription upon installation of 
cable.116  None of the Plaintiffs received this notice because they subscribed 
prior to the inclusion of the arbitration agreements.117  However, Comcast sent 
notice of the amended Policies & Practices governing subscription to each of 
its subscribers, including Plaintiffs, annually.118 
In 2003, based on claims of Comcast’s anticompetitive practices, two 
groups of plaintiffs separately filed complaints.119  Both complaints ended up 
in United States District Court.120  Comcast then sought to compel arbitration 
pursuant to its amended terms and conditions.121  Plaintiffs argued that their 
complaints arose from problems existing prior to the amended terms and 
conditions and therefore were not subject to the mandatory arbitration 
provisions.122  Furthermore, even if the provisions did apply, Plaintiffs argued 
that the arbitration agreements precluded vindication of their statutory rights 
under federal antitrust law, were unconscionable under state law, and were 
contrary to public policy.123  The courts presiding over each case found that the 
dispute could not be arbitrated because Plaintiffs were customers prior to the 
2001, 2002 and 2003 amendments of Comcast’s Policies & Practices and that 
the amendments could not apply retroactively.124  The district courts never 
addressed whether the arbitration agreements were unconscionable, contrary to 
public policy or prevented Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights.125  
Both cases were consolidated for appeal to the First Circuit.126 
 
Id. 
 115. See generally Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31–32. 
 116. Id. at 30. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  Comcast’s new arbitration provision was included in its Policies & Practices and was 
sent to “each Boston area subscriber's invoice as a billing stuffer during the November 2001 
billing cycle.”  Id.  The Policies & Practices of Comcast in 2002 and 2003 differed substantially 
from the 2001 version.  Id.  In this case, Comcast relied on the mandatory arbitration and class 
action waiver provisions in the 2002/2003 version.  Id. 
 119. Id. at 30–33.  Plaintiffs “filed a complaint against Comcast and AT&T Broadband in 
Massachusetts state court, alleging a cause of action under the Massachusetts Antitrust Act, Mass. 
Gen. Laws. Ch. 93.”  Id.  Plaintiffs Kristian and Masterson “filed a complaint against Comcast, as 
well as several other Comcast entities, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
alleging causes of action under the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26.  Id. at 31–32. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 64. 
 126. Id. at 31. 
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C. First Circuit’s Analysis 
Reviewing the district court decisions de novo, the First Circuit first held 
that Comcast’s amended terms and conditions, including the relevant 
arbitration provisions, did apply retroactively.127  Therefore, Plaintiffs were 
subject to the mandatory arbitration agreement pursuant to Comcast’s 
2002/2003 Policies & Practices.128  This is the effect of the terms applying 
retroactively, even though those terms were not the initial terms under which 
Plaintiffs accepted service. 
In their appeal, Plaintiffs argued that even if the arbitration agreement 
applied to them, arbitration was not a fair and adequate alternative to a court of 
law.  Thus, Plaintiffs claimed that the mandatory arbitration agreement, even if 
applicable, violated their statutory rights because it allowed for limited 
discovery, a shortened statute of limitations, barred recovery of treble 
damages, precluded plaintiffs from recovering attorney’s fees and prohibited 
the use of class mechanisms.129  Plaintiffs’ vindication of statutory rights 
argument was based on “the presumption that arbitration provides a fair and 
adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights.”130  Arbitration’s original 
purpose was to serve as an alternative method for dispute resolution where the 
parties agreed to be bound,131 and it only remains a legitimate alternative 
where it does fairly and adequately enforce statutory rights.132 
D. The Supreme Court Trilogy 
To determine whether the arbitration agreement’s prohibition on the use of 
class mechanisms prevented Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights, 
the court first had to decide whether this was a question that could be answered 
by the court itself or whether it had to be answered by an arbitrator.133  While a 
court’s jurisdiction is derived from a federal or state constitution, “an 
arbitrator’s authority to settle disputes is only established through private 
 
 127. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 64. 
 128. See generally id. 
 129. Id. at 37. 
 130. Id.  (citing Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st 
Cir. 1999)); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985) (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function.”). 
 131. See generally BENNETT, supra note 12, at 9–10; Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37. 
 132. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37 (“[U]nless the arbitral forum provided by a given agreement 
provides for the fair and adequate enforcement of a party's statutory rights, the arbitral forum runs 
afoul of [the] presumption [of fairness and adequacy] and loses its claim as a valid alternative to 
traditional litigation.”). 
 133. Id. at 37–42. 
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contractual arrangements between the parties themselves.”134  As a result, all 
issues not explicitly assigned to arbitration through the arbitration agreement 
between the parties go to the courts.135  When there is an issue of whether to 
arbitrate in the first place, there is an issue of arbitrability.136  Here, Comcast’s 
contract was silent as to whether a court or arbitrator was to be the decision 
maker if a question of arbitrability arose.137  For the answer, the court looked 
to three Supreme Court cases, Howsam,138 PacifiCare,139 and Bazzle,140 
referred to as the “Supreme Court Trilogy.”141  The Court ultimately 
determined that it could determine the question of arbitrability, not an 
arbitrator.142  Because Howsam, Pacificare and Bazzle formed the analysis of 
each of the Plaintiff’s statutory rights claims, this Note will now discuss them. 
1. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court analyzed 
how to determine whether an arbitrator or a court should determine preliminary 
matters to an arbitration dispute.143  For this reason the case is relevant to an 
understanding of the First Circuit’s decision in Kristian.144 
The crux of the dispute in Howsam was an arbitration rule of the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) which had a six-year statute of 
limitations.145  The defendant argued the arbitration provision was inapplicable 
because the dispute between defendant and plaintiff was more than six years 
old.146  It was left to the Supreme Court to determine whether a court or an 
arbitrator should decide how the NASD rule was meant to apply and whether 
or not it applied to the case at hand.147  In Howsam, the Court found that the 
parties did not intend for a court to decide the proper application of the NASD 
rule, but instead intended the question to be decided by an arbitrator.148 
Generally, there is a presumption that parties would prefer a court to 
determine whether a dispute should be submitted to arbitration pursuant to 
 
 134. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1684. 
 135. Id. at 1685. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31–32. 
 138. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
 139. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003). 
 140. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 141. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37. 
 142. Id. at 53–54. 
 143. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84–85. 
 144. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37. 
 145. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 81. 
 146. Id. at 82. 
 147. Id. at 82–83. 
 148. Id. at 83. 
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their arbitration agreement.149  This determination is described as the 
“interpretive rule.”150  Ultimately, a court determines whether the parties 
ordinarily would have intended a court or an arbitrator to settle “questions of 
arbitrability.”151  If a court finds the parties intended for questions of 
arbitrability to be determined by a court, then they will be.152  Likewise, if it is 
clear and unmistakable that the parties wanted an arbitrator to decide the 
applicability of arbitration provisions, then the “interpretive rule” will not 
apply and an arbitrator, not a court, will decide the case.153 
To simplify the application of this rule, the Supreme Court listed two types 
of disputes where courts rather than arbitrators will resolve gateway “questions 
of arbitrability.”154  First, courts will generally resolve the dispute where it is 
“about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause.”155  Second, 
courts will decide gateway issues where they are about whether an arbitration 
agreement in a binding contract can apply to a particular type of 
controversy.156  However, this is merely a presumption and can be waived by 
the parties through contract.157 
Moreover, where an arbitrator to a specific dispute would have far more 
expertise than a judge, the arbitrator should preside over the case.158  This rule 
is known as the “concept of comparative expertise.”159  In Howsam, the NASD 
arbitrators had far more expertise than a judge in understanding their own 
rules.  A NASD arbitrator would be in a better position to understand, interpret 
and apply NASD rules.  Therefore, where the parties are silent on whether a 
court or arbitrator will determine “questions of arbitrability,” the rule of 
comparative expertise may also apply.160 
Here, the Supreme Court was seeking to create rules which would uncover 
the parties’ intentions.161  This accomplishes the goal of the FAA, which is that 
an arbitration agreement should be treated “like any other contract, in which 
the intentions of the parties are paramount.”162 
 
 149. Id. at 82. 
 150. Id. at 83. 
 151. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. 
 152. Id. at 84. 
 153. Id. at 84–85. 
 154. Id. at 84. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1687. 
 158. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. 
 159. Kristian v. Comcast, 446 F.3d 25, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85). 
 160. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85. 
 161. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1687. 
 162. Id. 
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2. Pacificare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book and Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle 
Shortly after its decision in Howsam the Supreme Court decided 
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book and Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle.163  The Court in Kristian relied on both cases to decide whether an 
arbitrator or a court should determine if Plaintiffs were precluded from 
enforcing their statutory rights through mandatory arbitration.164 
In PacifiCare, several healthcare management organizations (“HMOs”) 
were facing claims by a group of physicians under a Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) statute.165  The HMOs sought to compel 
arbitration.166  The physicians claimed they could not be compelled to arbitrate 
because of the conflict between the type of damages allowed under RICO and 
the arbitration provision.167  As a result of the conflict, the physicians claimed 
they would be unable to obtain “meaningful relief.”168  The HMOs insisted 
there was no question of arbitrability, and hence the case should immediately 
go to an arbitrator.169 
The Supreme Court compelled arbitration.170  It was unclear without 
further inquiry whether or not the arbitration agreement conflicted with 
RICO.171  If the Court found a conflict, plaintiffs would be left with no 
meaningful cause of action and the validity of the arbitration would therefore 
be undermined.172  Due to the strong public policy in favor of arbitration, the 
Court concluded that the decision maker in such a case should be an 
arbitrator.173  The Court reasoned that it is not its job to speculate as to how an 
arbitrator might rule.174  Therefore, when an arbitrator’s decision will 
determine whether there is a conflict between an arbitration provision and 
governing law, “a court should not foreclose the operation of that presumption 
by deciding that there is a question of arbitrability when there is the possibility 
that an arbitrator’s decision in the first instance would obviate the need for 
judicial decision making.”175 
 
 163. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 39–40; see also PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 
401 (2003); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 164. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 39–40. 
 165. PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 402. 
 166. Id. at 403. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 403–04. 
 170. Id. at 407. 
 171. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 40 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 172. Id. (citing PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406–07). 
 173. PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 407 n.2. 
 174. Id. at 406–07. 
 175. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 40. 
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Lastly, the First Circuit considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Bazzle.  
The contract in Bazzle was between a commercial lender and its customers.  It 
provided for mandatory arbitration but was silent on the issue of class action 
arbitration.176  The commercial lender, Green Tree, claimed arbitration could 
not be conducted as a class because the arbitration agreement did not 
specifically authorize class mechanisms.177 
The Court, to the dismay of many, did not rule as to whether or not 
arbitration could proceed on a class-wide basis where the language of a 
contract is ambiguous.178  Instead, the Court held that because the contract 
itself did not address class arbitration, its terms were unclear and “‘present[ed] 
a disputed issue of contract interpretation.’”179  Therefore, instead of 
determining whether or not the arbitration could proceed on a class-wide basis, 
the Court addressed who should be the decision-maker in the case, an arbitrator 
or a court.180 
Essentially, Bazzle means that where a contract is silent or ambiguous as to 
whether arbitration can proceed as a class, a procedural gateway issue is 
created.181  As such, it is something courts will assume the parties intended an 
arbitrator decide.182  Bazzle did not involve a gateway matter but a dispute as to 
the type of arbitration agreement the parties entered.183  Because such a dispute 
does not involve state statutes or judicial procedures, but instead “concerns 
contract interpretation and arbitration procedures,” an arbitrator, and not a 
court, should be the decision-maker.184  Therefore, when there is a dispute as to 
what type of arbitration the parties agreed to, under Bazzle, an arbitrator should 
resolve the dispute. 
D. Summary and Application of the Trilogy 
The First Circuit in Kristian relied on the three preceding cases to form its 
decision.185  The Supreme Court’s decision in Howsam informed the court that 
in certain situations there is a general presumption that the parties would prefer 
 
 176. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003). 
 177. Id. at 447. 
 178. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1699. 
 179. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 41 (citing Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 450). 
 180. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53. 
 181. Lipshutz, supra note 5, at 1700. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 41; see also Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53 (The court stated that when 
the dispute is only as to what type of arbitration applies, an arbitrator and not a court should be 
the decision-maker because “that question does not concern a state statute or judicial procedure.  
It concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedure.  Arbitrators are well situated to 
answer that question.”). 
 184. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453. 
 185. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 39. 
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a court and not an arbitrator preside over their case.186  There are two such 
instances, both of which apply to substantive gateway matters: 1) whether the 
parties ever agreed to arbitrate; and 2) whether the arbitration agreement 
applies to the given controversy.187  However, where the gateway issue is 
procedural in nature courts should assume that the parties intended an 
arbitrator preside over their case.  In PacifiCare, the Supreme Court added that 
where resolution of the controversy determines whether the case will be 
subject to arbitration, the courts should defer to arbitrators.188  The reasoning is 
that courts should not take it upon themselves to speculate as to what decision 
an arbitrator will reach where the arbitrator’s initial decision could make a 
judicial decision unnecessary.189  Finally, in Bazzle, the Supreme Court held 
that where the parties agreed to arbitrate but are in dispute as to what form 
arbitration is to take, such as when a contract is silent, an arbitrator shall make 
the decision.190 
In Kristian, Plaintiffs contended that the “Policies & Practices as a whole 
[were] valid.”191  However, they contended the arbitration agreement was 
invalid because when it was applied to their anti-trust claim it precluded them 
from getting their statutorily guaranteed relief.192  They were not arguing that 
the arbitration agreement could not apply in antitrust cases but that “arbitration 
subject to the provisions at issue shield[ed] Comcast from antitrust liability, 
and hence conflict[ed] with the statute providing for such liability.”193  The 
First Circuit determined, based on the Supreme Court Trilogy, that Plaintiff’s 
“challenges to the Policies & Practice’s . . . class arbitration bar did pose [a 
question] of arbitrability.”194 
 
 186. Id. at 39. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 40. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 41. 
 191. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 41–42. 
 192. Id. at 42. 
 193. Id.  The Court also noted: 
It is true that the district court concluded that the Policies & Practices is a contract of 
adhesion.  However, under Massachusetts law, contracts of adhesion—like the Policies & 
Practices—are generally enforceable absent a separate finding that such contracts are 
‘unconscionable, offend public policy, or are shown to be unfair in particular 
circumstances.’ The Policies & Practices is not invalid simply because it is a contract of 
adhesion.   
Id. at 42 n.10 (internal citations omitted). 
 194. Id. at 64. 
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E. Questions of Arbitrability: Class Arbitration 
The Court ultimately concluded that it, and not an arbitrator, was the 
proper decision-maker in the Kristian case.195  Comcast, citing Bazzle, claimed 
that the issue of whether or not the arbitration could proceed without class 
actions was a procedural issue for an arbitrator to decide.196  However, here, 
unlike in Bazzle where the contract was silent as to whether class mechanisms 
could be utilized, the 2002-2003 arbitration agreement explicitly forbade class 
arbitration.197  Also, in Bazzle, there was never a dispute as to whether a ban on 
class actions made the arbitration agreement unenforceable.198  Basically, the 
question in Kristian was one of arbitrabillity. 
Therefore, under Howsam, the controversy over whether the arbitration 
agreement was valid was for the courts, and not an arbitrator.199  Kristian did 
not fall within the realm of PacifiCare because it was clear by the language of 
the agreement that banning all class mechanisms and demanding mandatory 
arbitration, in this situation, precluded Plaintiffs from vindicating their 
statutory rights.200  In PacifiCare it was unclear whether there really was a 
conflict in terms.  Therefore, the Court left it up to the arbitrator to determine if 
there was in fact a conflict.201  Kristian also was not within the realm of Bazzle 
because, in that case, the arbitration agreement was unclear as to whether 
arbitration had to proceed on an individual basis or could proceed as a class.202  
Here, the arbitration provision clearly forbade class mechanisms.203 
Thus, there was a question of whether the agreement was arbitrable at 
all.204  Moreover, while the Supreme Court has never faced a case with the 
exact facts of Kristian, other federal courts have addressed similar cases and 
held that questions of arbitrability similar to those in Kristian should be 
submitted for arbitration.205  Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit, in Jenkins v. 
First Am. Cash Advance of Georgia,206 faced a similar issue and held there 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 53. 
 197. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31–32. 
 198. Id. at 53–54 (quoting Green Tree Servicing Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003) 
(“[Green Tree] does not apply here because of the clarity of the prohibition against class 
arbitration”)). 
 199. Id. at 38–39. 
 200. Id. at 45. 
 201. Id. at 40. 
 202. Id. at 53–54. 
 203. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 53–54. 
 204. Id. at 55 (stating that although neither the court nor the Supreme Court, had ever faced a 
case exactly similar to Kristian, other courts of appeals had, and had found that there was a 
question of arbitrability). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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were questions of arbitrability.207  But ultimately the court in Kristian based its 
decision on state unconscionability statutes and not on a vindication of 
statutory rights analysis.208  Even so, the Eleventh Circuit previously decided a 
case on the basis of “vindication of statutory rights,” and held that the two 
rationales were similar.209  Therefore, because this case presented a question of 
arbitrability, then, as held in Howsam, the issue of the enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement was for the courts. 
F. The Merits in Kristian v. Comcast 
In reviewing the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim, the court held that the 
“arbitration agreement’s language ostensibly conflict[ed] with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for class actions.”210  The Court used 
the word “ostensibly” because Comcast’s contract precluded only class 
arbitration, not class actions.211  Nonetheless, the court held that because 
Comcast had a mandatory arbitration provision and because that provision 
precluded class arbitration, all class mechanisms were essentially unavailable 
to Plaintiffs.212 
Because all class mechanisms were banned where there was mandatory 
arbitration and a preclusion of class arbitration, the presumption that arbitration 
provided “a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights,”213 
undermines the very policy behind class actions.214  The policy at the very 
center of class actions is that where individual claims are very small, there is 
no incentive for a plaintiff to bring an individual claim.215  As a result, that 
individual’s rights are never vindicated.  This policy was upheld by the 
Seventh Circuit, which stated: 
It would hardly be an improvement to have in lieu of [a] single class action 
17,000,000 suits each seeking $15.00 to $30.00 . . . . The realistic alternative 
 
 207. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 55 n.18. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 54.  The 2002/2003 arbitration agreement stated the following in bold capital 
letters: 
There shall be no right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated on a class action or 
consolidated basis or on bases involving claims brought in a purported representative 
capacity on behalf of the general public (such as a private attorney general), other 
subscribers, or other persons similarly situation unless your state’s laws provide 
otherwise.   
Id. at 53. 
 211. Id. at 54. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54 (quoting Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
170 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 214. Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)). 
 215. Id. 
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to a class action is not 17,000,000 individuals’ suits, but zero individual suits, 
as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.00.216 
The court addressed Comcast’s contention that class arbitration was merely 
a way to redress claims and not a statutory or substantive right by holding that 
it “[could not] ignore the substantive implications of [it as a] procedural 
mechanism.”217  If each individual Comcast subscriber brought a claim 
individually, recovery would range from a few hundred to a few thousand 
dollars.218  Meanwhile, it was estimated that, excluding attorney’s fees and 
other fees, the cost of expert fees alone would be hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.219  It is highly unlikely that any Comcast subscriber, let alone all those 
wishing to bring a claim, had the necessary funds to pay this cost up front.220  
Even if Plaintiffs could afford to pay the expert’s fees, it was even extremely 
unlikely that they would when only expecting to recover a few hundred to a 
few thousand dollars.221 
Thus, by explicitly mandating arbitration and explicitly banning class 
actions, Plaintiffs would be unable to spread expert’s fees, attorney’s fees, and 
other court fees among themselves and would ultimately be deterred from 
bringing their claims at all.222  Moreover, as the Supreme Court opined in 
Alabama v.Randolph, “the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a 
litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the 
arbitral forum.”223  Here, the court found the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Randolph certainly applied.224  For this reason the Court held that the ban on 
class arbitration precluded Plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory 
rights under Rule 23 and was therefore unenforceable.225 
 
 216. Id. (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 54–55. 
 222. Id. (quoting Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407 (2005) (“The class mechanism 
ban ‘particularly its implicit ban on spreading across multiple plaintiffs the costs of experts, 
depositions, neutrals’ fees, and other disbursements’—forces the putative class member ‘to 
assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims. . . .  And these 
costs . . . will exceed the value of the recovery she is seeking.’”)). 
 223. Id. at 55 (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 55. 
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G. The Comcast Court’s Decision in Comparison to Other Federal Circuit 
Courts 
The Kristian court noted that the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits upheld bans on class mechanisms in mandatory arbitration agreements 
but distinguished the cases before those courts from Kristian.226  First, in each 
of the four circuits, either the plaintiffs did not claim that costs were so 
prohibitive as to prevent them from being able to vindicate their rights 
individually or their arbitration and attorney’s fees were recoverable.227  For 
example, the court distinguished the Third Circuit’s holding in Johnson v. West 
Suburban Bank because the plaintiffs in Johnson could have recovered 
attorney’s fees and they would have been able to find an ample number of 
attorneys willing to represent them.228  As such, because Plaintiffs could be 
fairly and adequately represented with no upfront costs, they were still able to 
have their rights vindicated, even if they had to arbitrate individually.229  
Likewise, the defendant in the Seventh Circuit case, Livingston v. Associates 
Fin., Inc., agreed to pay all of the plaintiff’s arbitration fees.230 
The second important commonality in the decisions of these other four 
circuit courts is that all of the plaintiffs were bringing claims against banks or 
financial institutions under the TILA.231  In contrast, the Kristian plaintiffs 
brought their claims under state and federal antitrust law.232  In analyzing the 
differences between the cases, the Kristian court focused on the Third Circuit 
 
 226. Livingston v. Associates Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[H]aving found 
the Arbitration Agreement enforceable we must give full force to its terms . . . .  The Arbitration 
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statutory rights under TILA.”); Id. at 55–56; see also Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 
366, 379 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because there is not irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the 
goals of the TILA, we similarly hold that claims arising under the EFTA [Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act] may also be subject to arbitration notwithstanding the desire of a plaintiff who 
previously consented to arbitration to bring his or her claims as part of a class.”).   
 227. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 56 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 228. Id. (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374). 
 229. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374–75. 
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case Johnson v. West Suburban Bank.233  This is because the other circuit court 
decisions relied on the precedent set forth in Johnson.234 
The Third Circuit in Johnson relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gilmer v. Livingston/Johnson Lane Corp.235  In Gilmer, the plaintiff 
challenged arbitration on the grounds that it did not permit class 
mechanisms.236  The Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff, who 
brought an age discrimination case, could effectively vindicate his statutory 
rights in the arbitral forum, arbitration should be compelled.237  The Third 
Circuit extended this holding relating to the ADEA to claims brought under 
TILA.238  The cases reflect both that the parties contracted to arbitrate and that 
so long as plaintiffs could enforce their statutory rights through arbitration, the 
contract provision would be upheld.239  In Johnson, because the plaintiff was 
able to recover attorney’s fees and costs, could also have his rights enforced 
through administrative means, and would not have necessarily received a 
greater recovery by proceeding as a member of a class, the court upheld the bar 
on class mechanisms.240 
Ultimately, the reasons the Third Circuit used to uphold the ban on class 
mechanisms in the arbitral forum did not apply to the plaintiff’s antitrust 
claims in Kristian.241  First, there is a fundamental difference between 
litigating TILA claims and antitrust claims because antitrust claims are far 
more involved and complex.  Generally, under TILA a specific act or 
transaction is in dispute.242  Because TILA claims normally involve a specific 
act, they involve a more simplistic analysis.  However, determining whether a 
company violated state and federal antitrust laws requires looking at the 
businesses actions as a whole,243 which entails looking much deeper in a much 
more complicated, expensive and time consuming analysis.244  Likewise, the 
antitrust laws themselves are very complex and difficult to comprehend.  This 
fact is bolstered by uncontested expert affidavits submitted by plaintiffs that 
detail the time consumption, expense and labor required to prosecute antitrust 
claims.245  One unopposed expert with twenty-six years of experience litigating 
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 235. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 56. 
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class actions stated that in order to prosecute the antitrust claims plaintiffs 
would have to undertake: 
[D]efining the relevant product market, defining the relevant geographic 
market, establishing the market power of defendants and the manner in which 
they exercised such power; the effects of potential competition within the 
relevant markets; the impact of conduct on any non-incumbent cable providers 
in the relevant market; analyzing the ‘swapping’ agreements alleged in the 
Complaint, as well as merger and purchase of asset transactions that 
defendants may have been involved in relating to the alleged monopolization 
conduct; reviewing and analyzing the increases in cable subscription rates over 
time; establishing Comcast’s alleged monopoly overcharges in relevant 
markets; and further calculating the named plaintiffs’ damages.246 
Expert fees alone were estimated to range from $300,000 to over 
$600,000.247  This cost did not even take into account additional fees such as 
computer analysis or air travel reimbursements.248  Nor does it take into 
account attorney’s fees or court costs, none of which are recoverable under 
Comcast’s arbitration agreement.249  Most importantly, considering the huge 
expense alone, which one expert estimated could reach into the millions, the 
individual recovery for a plaintiff would likely range from a few hundred to a 
few thousand dollars.250  Based on the foregoing, it is highly unlikely that 
consumer antitrust plaintiffs, such as those in Kristian, would bring claims if 
precluded from using class mechanisms. 
Second, unlike in Johnson, antitrust consumers like those in Kristian will 
be unable to find representation because, unlike claims brought under TILA, 
attorney’s fees and costs are not recoverable under Comcast’s arbitration 
agreement.251  As explained above, the cost for the Kristian plaintiffs is 
substantial and an attorney would have to have hundreds of thousands to 
millions of dollars to invest upfront for only a few hundred to few thousand 
dollars likely to be recovered.  Considering the uncertainty as to whether 
plaintiffs will win or lose on their claim, the attorneys could potentially lose 
over a million dollars, have no guarantees, and see nothing in return.252  
Therefore, it was highly unlikely that any attorney would be willing to 
represent an individual plaintiff against Comcast.253 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58.   
 249. Id. at 50. 
 250. Id. at 58. 
 251. Id. at 57–60. 
 252. Id. at 59 (Plaintiffs’ expert, Howard J. Sedran, noted that “[i]t should not surprise anyone 
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For this reason alone there was sufficient support for the court to find the 
arbitration agreement unenforceable.  Several courts have struck down class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements where the recovery is so small that no 
reasonable person would bring a claim.254  The courts in these cases have 
realized that “by increasing plaintiff’s transaction costs, defendants can induce 
them to accept lower settlements or even drop their claims altogether.”255  
Requiring arbitration and banning class mechanisms is contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s justification for class actions: that it is often irrational or impractical 
for individuals to bring claims when recoveries are small and costs are 
prohibitive. 
Finally, unlike in Johnson, it was unlikely that administrative enforcement 
of antitrust claims would remedy the plaintiffs’ injuries.256  When Congress 
enacts a statue and calls for both private and administrative enforcement of the 
statute, it envisions both will play a role in ensuring the law is followed and 
carried out.257  Where private enforcement is virtually impossible, Congress’s 
intent is undermined and true enforcement is unlikely to exist.258 
Based on the huge differences in complexity, cost, and other methods of 
enforcement between TILA claims and antitrust claims, the reasoning used by 
the Third Circuit could not apply in Kristian.259  Therefore, because the bar on 
plaintiffs’ use of class mechanism precludes them from enforcing their 
statutory rights, they could not be compelled to arbitrate their claims if forced 
to do so individually.260 
H. Other Courts 
In its final point of analysis, the court in Kristian supported its position 
with the holdings of other courts.261  For the most part, those courts refusing to 
compel arbitration where class mechanisms are banned are state courts who are 
applying state unconscionability statutes.262  The Kristian court stated that 
because “many unconscionability arguments are merely reiterations of 
vindication of statutory rights arguments,” they are equally supportive of its 
holding.263 
 
 254. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 59. 
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One example of a similar unconscionability argument is the Ninth Circuit 
holding in Ting v. AT&T.264  In Ting, the court held that arbitration could not 
be enforced where there was a ban on class mechanisms, pursuance of 
individual claims was not economically feasible, and no claims were likely to 
be brought absent the availability of class mechanisms.265  The court also noted 
that even if a claim were brought a plaintiff would be highly unlikely to find an 
attorney willing to handle the case where attorney’s fees and costs were not 
recoverable under the arbitration agreement.266  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 
held that a ban on class mechanisms in the arbitral forum was such a deterrent 
to litigation of claims that the corporate defendant was essentially shielded 
from all liability.267  The court in Kristian, relying on Ting, also found that 
because plaintiffs had no way to vindicate their statutory rights if unable to 
bring their claims against Comcast as a class, Comcast would be able to shield 
itself from liability.268  Moreover, this would frustrate the enforcement of 
antitrust laws because all of Comcast’s subscribers with similar claims either 
would be unable to withstand the cost to bring claims individually or would be 
able to find representation.269 
I. The Kristian Court’s Conclusion 
Ultimately, the court severed the portions of the arbitration agreement 
banning class mechanisms.  However, the arbitration agreement itself was not 
severed.  Plaintiffs were therefore compelled to arbitrate but were permitted to 
do so on a class-wide basis. 
V.  EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF KRISTIAN 
Due to the unsteady history and inherent distrust of arbitration, courts have 
struggled with the enforcement of arbitration agreements for the past 
century.270  While congressional adoption of the FAA in 1925 and a federal 
policy very much in favor of arbitration have reinforced the validity and 
enforceability of arbitration, courts are still weary to enforce it in situations 
involving mandatory arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion between 
corporations and ordinary consumers.271  The result for courts has been several 
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decades of unclear case law which shirks the major issues altogether.272  For 
this reason, Kristian v. Comcast, the second federal circuit court case to find 
bans on class arbitration unenforceable and the first to find so on a theory of 
vindication of statutory rights, is important and insightful. 
Though Kristian is a novel holding and helps to elucidate a controversial 
area of law, even on adoption by the Supreme Court or other courts it is 
unlikely to have much impact on the law for two primary reasons.  First, where 
an arbitration agreement is silent, Supreme Court precedent in Bazzle and 
Howsam indicates that a procedural issue of arbitrability is present and the 
proper decision-maker is an arbitrator.273  Second, even where class actions are 
explicitly banned, Kristian may not apply as it is likely to be read narrowly. 
First, under Bazzle and Howsam, where an arbitration agreement is silent 
and the only issue is whether arbitration can proceed as a class, an arbitrator, 
not a court, is the proper decision-maker.274  Therefore, if a corporation wishes 
to avoid judicial review of its arbitration agreement, it need only remain silent 
as to whether class actions are barred.  The Supreme Court in Bazzle never got 
to the merits of the case nor determined whether class actions could be barred 
because they determined there was not an issue of arbitrability for them to 
decide.275  Because there is such a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration 
and because the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be considered 
equivalent to any other contractual provision, this must be the case.276 
In Kristian, if Comcast had not explicitly barred class mechanisms the 
First Circuit’s only allowable action, if abiding by Supreme Court precedent, 
would be to apply the holding of Bazzle and leave interpretation of the contract 
to an arbitrator.  Therefore, if courts begin following Kristian, corporations 
wishing to stay out of court would likely remain silent on the issue of class 
mechanisms.  Because an arbitrator would not be bound by the First Circuit’s 
holding, and because the great weight of authority is contrary to the Kristian 
decision, it is not possible to determine whether arbitration on a class-wide 
basis would be allowed or prohibited. 
In the end, arbitration has proven to be equally fair to both major 
corporations and individual consumers, so there need not be a fear that a major 
conglomerate will be able to stifle the rights of consumers indefinitely.277  
However, it is not clear that Kristian would greatly impact the law.  
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Additionally, because there is no record as in judicial decisions, it would not be 
as persuasive as in a judicial court, even if followed. 
If the effect of Kristian and subsequent cases decided similarly encourages 
companies to leave their arbitration agreements vague so that the only issues 
will be of procedural arbitrability, there are several implications.  First, absent 
congressional direction as to whether arbitration can proceed as a class and 
when it cannot, arbitrators will have great discretion to determine whether or 
not class mechanisms may be prohibited.  One negative aspect of this scenario 
is that arbitrators have less experience in certifying and managing class 
actions.278  In cases where class arbitration has been permitted, such as in 
California, judges have kept a watchful eye and ensured that notice, 
certification and management of the class was as prescribed.279  Also, class 
actions can be dangerous in arbitration because they are more private and 
notice is more difficult.280  Because of the opt-out provision in Rule 23(b)(3), it 
becomes more worrisome that a future litigant will be unable to bring a valid 
claim because they were joined to a class, unaware, left without recovery, and 
were subsequently bound by the arbitrators decision.281  Moreover, this result 
would undermine the very policy at the core of arbitration that the parties agree 
to arbitrate and agree to be bound.282  Under Rule 23(b)(3), it is possible that a 
person never intended to be bound but nonetheless is.  However, this can 
hardly be used to attack class actions as the policies under arbitration have 
eroded such that an arbitration provision hidden in small print on the back of a 
standard form contract are sufficient to bind plaintiffs.283 
Second, even if Kristian is adopted by the Supreme Court or all other 
courts, it is not likely to greatly impact the law because it will likely be read 
narrowly.  Ultimately, the effect of Kristian for all courts wishing to mirror its 
decision is that for every type of claim there must be analysis as to whether 
arbitration can fairly proceed on a class-wide basis. 
The First Circuit went to considerable lengths to discover whether in 
Kristian, which dealt with antitrust claims, Plaintiffs were unable to vindicate 
their statutory rights.284  By the court’s own admission, antitrust law is a very 
analytical and complex area of law that requires extensive research and 
analysis to determine whether there has been a violation.285  Due to its 
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complexity and the absence of provisions allowing for attorney’s fees to be 
recovered, antitrust law is especially expensive and unique.286 
The Supreme Court, while not providing many clear answers, has already 
stated that in certain cases, such as ADEA cases (i.e., Gilmer), plaintiffs are 
not disadvantaged by having to bring claims individually.287  While the 
Supreme Court noted its holding may not be the most fair or convenient 
solution for consumers, the parties had the ability under both the FAA and 
contract law to choose their dispute settlement procedure.288  The First Circuit 
only held as it did because, unlike ADEA claims, antitrust law is so much more 
complex, requires more sophisticated analysis, and does not allow for recovery 
of attorney’s fees.289 
In fact, Kristian does little to clarify the law for corporations or consumers 
dealing with arbitration disputes.  The only clear guideline from Kristian is that 
under state and federal antitrust law, plaintiffs are precluded from vindicating 
their statutory rights if class mechanisms are barred because the cost of 
litigation is so prohibitive and the availability of counsel is limited.  Because 
the Supreme Court, and several other circuit courts, have already considered 
the same issue in other contexts, they are likely to be more determinative than 
Kristian.290 
If a plaintiff in another circuit brings the same or similar case, there is no 
guarantee that a federal court will rely on the First Circuit’s decision because it 
does not bind the other circuits and is in the minority in comparison to other 
federal circuit courts that have considered the issue.  Even if a comparable case 
comes to the First Circuit, the court will again have to reweigh every factor to 
determine whether the case is more like Kristian and antitrust law, or more like 
an ADEA or TILA claim, which the vast majority of federal courts hold can 
bar class arbitration. 
Finally, if courts, corporations and consumers are unhappy with the fact 
that all arbitration provisions could potentially be silent on whether class 
actions can be precluded and thus go to arbitration, then Congress, the body 
that enacted the FAA in 1925, should be called on to correct the problem.  
Congress has the authority to state whether arbitration can proceed on a class-
wide basis or can strengthen the Kristian decision by providing examples of 
the types of cases, such as antitrust cases, where arbitration can and should 
proceed on a class-wide basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
In sum, arbitration has created conflict among the courts for the past 
century.  While the First Circuit’s decision in Kristian is novel and seems 
contradictory to that in other circuits, in reality, it is not.  The First Circuit 
went to considerable effort to elucidate the differences between antitrust law 
and other areas of law under which such claims had been brought before, such 
as ADEA or TILA.  It is unlikely that if the First Circuit were to consider 
whether arbitration could proceed absent class mechanisms in a claim brought 
under TILA or ADEA, it would find the agreement unenforceable.  
Nonetheless, Kristian is an important case and will likely prove to be a guiding 
light as courts continue to define the bounds of arbitration law absent Supreme 
Court and congressional guidance.  If anything, Kristian reflects that the debate 
among the courts is far from over and more likely that not, will continue to 
create divisions. 
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